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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellants Richard and Lisa Keane, Keane Land Company, PLLC, and Keane and Co. 
Construction, Inc. (collectively "the Keanes") appeal from the district court's denial of their Motion 
to Set Aside Default and denial of their Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief from Final Judgment ("Rule 
60(b) Motion"). On August 5, 2010, the district court entered an order permitting the Keanes' 
counsel leave to withdraw, which was served on the Keanes on August 9,2010. Respondent Dave 
Dorion ("Dorion") filed a Motion for Entry of Default on September 1, 2010, before the time period 
required under Rule 11 (b )(3) had run, and the district court granted the motion, entering default on 
September 8,2010. The district court then denied both the Keanes' Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Rule 60(b) Motion. The district court's denial of the Rule 60(b) Motion, or in the alternative the 
Motion to Set Aside Default, should be reversed and the matter remanded. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Dorion filed his Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ("Complaint") against the Keanes on 
February 24,2009. (Complaint, R. Vol. I, pp. 12-21.) The Complaint alleged six causes of action: 
(1) breach of contract; (2) specific performance; (3) quantum meruit/unjust enrichment; (4) breach 
of covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (5) breach of fiduciary duty; and (6) declaratory judgment. 
(lei.) The district court set aside an initial entry of default following a May 14,2009, hearing on the 
matter. (Opinion and Order on Motion to Set Aside Default, R. Vol. I, pp. 37-43.) The Keanes then 
filed their Answer to Complaint ("Answer") on May 27,2009, asserting the following affirmative 
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defenses: (1) Rule 12(b)(6) failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted; (2) Idaho Code 
§ 9-503 Statute of Frauds; and (3) improper designation of parties. (Answer, R. Vol. I, pp. 44-48.) 
The case progressed until July 27, 2010, when Manderson Miles, as attorney for the Keanes, 
moved to withdraw. (Motion to Withdraw, R. Vol. I, pp. 81-83.) The Order Permitting Leave to 
Withdraw was entered on August 5, 2010. (Motion to Augment Clerk's Record on Appeal ("Motion 
to Augment"), Affidavit of Mendy S. Maurer ("Maurer Aff. "), Ex. 1.) On August 9, 2010, the court 
served upon the Keanes by certified mail the Order Permitting Leave to Withdraw. ([d.) Dorion 
then filed a Motion for Entry of Default on September 1, 2010. (Opinion and Order on Defendants' 
Motion to Set Aside Default, R. Vol. I, p. 88.) Entry of default was made on September 8, 2010. 
(ld.) 
On September 17,2010, Todd Richardson made an appearance on behalf of the Keanes. ([d.) 
On that same date, he moved to set aside the entry of default. (Id.) On December 29,2010, the 
district court issued its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default and 
Plaintiffs Motion for Entry of Default Judgment, denying the Keanes' motion. (fd., pp. 86-92.) On 
January 14,2011, a default judgment was entered. (Judgment, R. Vol. I, pp. 93-95.) The Notice of 
Appeal was filed shortly thereafter, (Notice of Appeal, R. Vol. I, pp. 96-99), and an Amended Notice 
of Appeal was filed March 1,2011. (Amended Notice of Appeal, R. Vol. I, pp. 100-03.) 
The Keanes filed their Rule 60(b) Motion on March 21, 2011. (Register of Actions, R. Vol. 
I, p. 10.) Dorion filed his Memorandum in Opposition on March 31, 20111£(.) A hearing was held 
on the matter on April 7, 2011, at which time the district court mled from the bench and denied the 
Keanes' Rule 60(b) Motion. (Motion to Augment, Tr., April 7, 2011, Hr'g.) The Order Denying 
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Defendant's [sic] Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief From Final Judgment was entered April 11, 2011, 
and, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17(e)(l)(c), is deemed included on appeal. (Order Denying 
Motion, R. Vol. I, pp. 108-09.) 
C. Statement of Facts 
The pertinent facts are those contained within the Course of Proceedings above. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the district court erred in denying the Keanes' Rule 60(b) Motion because, as a 
matter of law, the default judgment was void. 
B. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the Keanes' Motion to Set Aside 
Default. 
C. Whether the Keanes are entitled to attorney fees on appeal. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
The default j udgment entered on January 14,2011, is void. The Motion for Entry of Default 
was filed within twenty-three (23) days from the date of service of the Order Permitting Leave to 
Withdraw to the Keanes in contravention of Rule 11(b)(3) and Rule 6(e)(1). Rule 60(b)(4) relieves 
a party from the judgment when it is void. Therefore, the district court erred in failing to relieve the 
Keanes from that judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) so this matter could be determined on the 
merits. 
In addition, the district court erred in failing to set aside the September 8, 2010, entry of 
default. The Keanes demonstrated good cause for setting aside the default and the district court 
abused its discretion in failing to consider the Keanes' arguments and defenses. 
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A. Standards of Review. 
Generally, the decision to grant or deny a motion to set aside a default or judgment by default 
is committed to the discretion of the trial court. Bach v. Miller, 148 Idaho 549, 552, 224 P.3d 1138, 
1141 (2010). The district court's denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment will not be 
disturbed on appeal, absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. In determining whether a court abused 
its discretion, the Idaho Supreme Court considers whether the district court: (1) correctly understood 
the issue to be one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer bounds of its discretion; and (3) reached 
its decision on the motion before it through the exercise of reason. Id. 
"However, where a default and default judgment are granted based on Rule 11 (b )(3) and later 
challenged under Rule 60(b)( 4), the standard of review is de novo." Fisher Sys. Leasing, Inc. v. J &J 
Gunsmithing & Weaponry Design, Inc., 135 Idaho 624, 627, 21 P.3d 946, 949 (Ct. App. 2001); see 
also McClure Eng'g, Inc. v. Channel 5 KIDA, 143 Idaho 950, 953,155 P.3d 1189, 1192 (Ct. App. 
2006) ("Whether the strictures of Rule II(b)(3) were satisfied is a question of law, and we therefore 
exercise de novo review."). Furthermore, if a judgment is voidable, it will be set aside as a matter 
of law. See Blanc v. Laritz, 119 Idaho 359, 361, 806 P.2d 452, 454 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Judgments by default are disfavored and "the general rule in doubtful cases is to grant relief 
from the default in order to reach a judgment on the merits." Nickels v. Durbano, 118 Idaho 198, 
201, 795 P.2d 903,906 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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B. The District Court Erred in Denying the Keanes' Rule 60(b) Motion Because the 
Default .Judgment was Void Pursuant to Rule (1l)(b)(3). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states, in pertinent part, that "[ o]n motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (4) the judgment is void ... " I.R.C.P.60(b)(4). 
This motion need only be made "within a reasonable time," and the district court may rule upon the 
motion during the pendency of an appeal. Id.; I.A.R. 13(b )(6). When default judgment is predicated 
upon an erroneously entered default, the judgment is void. Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 
704 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1985). "[S]trict compliance with Rule 11(b)(3) is required to obtain a valid 
judgment." Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571, 577, 212 P.3d 1001, 1007 (2009). The judgment here 
was void because proceedings affecting the Keanes' rights occurred within the twenty-three (23) day 
period proscribed in Rule 11(b)(3) and the Order Permitting Leave to Withdraw failed to comply 
with Rule 11 (b)(3). 
1. Proceedings affecting the Keanes' rights occurred within the twenty-three (23) 
day period provided by Rule 1l(b)(3). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(3) requires, whenever an attorney is granted leave to 
withdraw, "no further proceedings can be had in that action which will affect the rights of the party 
of the withdrawing attorney for a period of 20 days after service or mailing of the order of 
withdrawal to the party." I.R.C.P. 11(b)(3). rt is only when that party fails to file and serve an 
additional written appearance "within such 20 day period" that there are sufficient grounds for entry 
of default and default judgment. !d. 
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a. The motion filed by Dorion was a proceeding within the meaning of Rule 
11(b)(3) and it affected the Keanes' rights. 
As an initial matter, Rule II(b)(3) does not limit what is proscribed during the twenty-three 
(23) day period to the actual granting of relief or to any other action taken by the court, as argued by 
Dorion in the district court. The rule says ncproceedings can occur within that time frame. LR.C.P. 
II(b)(3). A motion is clearly a "proceeding." As defined in Black's Law Dictionary, a proceeding 
IS 
1. The regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts 
and events between the time of commencement and the entry of 
judgment. 2. Any procedural means for seeking redress from a 
tribunal or agency. 3. An act or step that is part of a larger action. 
4. The business conducted by a court or other official body; a 
hearing ... 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (8th ed. 2004). Black's also quotes with approval the following 
definition: 
'Proceeding' is a word much used to express the business done in 
courts. A proceeding in court is an act done by the authority or 
direction of the court, express or implied. It is more comprehensive 
than the word 'action,' but it may include in its general sense all the 
steps taken or measures adopted in the prosecution or defense of an 
action, including the pleadings and judgment. As applied to actions, 
the term 'proceeding' may include - (1) the institution of the action; 
(2) the appearance of the defendant; (3) all ancillary or provisional 
steps, such as arrest, attachment of property, garnishment, injunction, 
writ of ne exeat; (4) the pleadings; (5) the taking of testimony before 
trial; (6) all motions made in the action ; (7) the trial; (8) the 
judgment; (9) the execution; (10) proceedings supplementary to 
execution, in code practice; (11) the taking of the appeal or writ of 
error; (12) the remittur, or sending back of the record to the lower 
court from the appellate or reviewing court; (13) the enforcement of 
the judgment, or a new trial, as may be directed by the court of last 
resort. 
-6-
[d. (quoting Edwin E. Bryant, The Law of Pleading Under the Codes of Civil Procedure 3-4 (2d ed. 
1899» (emphasis added). A motion is a proceeding. 
The motion seeking default also affected the Keanes' rights. Rule l(a) states that "[t]hese 
rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action and proceeding." This elevates a proceeding to a legal right. The motion seeking default was 
the prerequisite to entry of default and ultimately the judgment. This proceeding had the ultimate 
effect on the Keanes' rights - the complete dismissal of their defense, a money judgment against 
them, and the loss of real property. Said another way, without the motion neither the default nor the 
judgment would have occurred. The motion was a proceeding affecting the Keanes' rights, which 
occurred within the proscribed period. This makes the judgment void. 
b. Rule 6(e) provides an automatic three (3) day extension to any period of 
time when service is completed by mail. 
Rule 6(e)(1) grants additional time after any service by mail in the following manner: 
Whenever a party has the right or is required to do some act or take 
some proceedings within a prescribed period after the service of a 
notice or other paper upon the party and the notice or paper is served 
upon the party by mail, three (3) days shall be added to the prescribed 
period. 
I.R.C.P. Rule 6(e)(1).1 Here, the Keanes were required to act within twenty (20) days after the Order 
Permitting Leave to Withdraw was served. However, because it was served by mail the Keanes had 
an additional three (3) days within which no further proceedings could be had. See LR.C.P. 11 (b )(3); 
I It should be noted that Rule 6(e)(l) speaks of "acts" or "proceedings" and applies to motions. See 
Ponderosa Paint Mfg., fnc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310, 870 P.2d 663 (Ct. App. 1994) (motions for summary judgment); 
State v. Schaffer, 112 Idaho 1024, 739 P.2d 323 (1987) (motions for automatic disqualification). This is further 
evidence that a motion is a proceeding. 
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LR.C.P.6(e)(l). As will be discussed more fully below, the Motion for Entry of Default was filed 
within that twenty-three (23) day period, making the judgment based on that motion and default void 
as a matter of law. 
Using a 2010 calendar, the following timeline shows that proceedings were taken which 
affected the rights of the Keanes within the twenty (20) plus three (3) day period within which no 
action should have been taken. 
DATE ACTION TAKEN 
08/09/10 - Order Permitting Leave to Withdraw served by certified mail 
Monday 
09/01110 - Dorion files Motion for Entry of Default 
Wednesday 
09/01110 - At midnight, the 23 day period expired 
Wednesday 
09/02/10 - First day any proceedings could have been taken in the action 
Thursday 
Under the rules, and because the Order Permitting Leave to Withdraw was served by mail, the 
Keanes were entitled to twenty-three (23) days of no action taken. Under the rules, one begins 
counting the day after the action that triggered the clock to begin running. Also, the last day counted 
falls within the proscribed period. Here, the twenty-third (23rd) day is included as a day on which 
no action can be taken. 
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The Order Permitting Leave to Withdraw was served by mail on Monday, August 9,2010. 
(See Motion to Augment, Maurer Aff., Ex. 1.) Therefore, the first day counted is Tuesday, August 
10,2010. Counting twenty-three (23) days, starting with August 10, 2010, the twenty-third (23rd) 
day is Wednesday, September 1,2010, and on that day no proceedings could be had. The Motion 
for Entry of Default was filed on Wednesday, September 1,2010, one day too soon. 2 It was filed 
within the proscribed period when no proceedings can be had. This was in contravention of Rule 
II(b)(3). Nor can it be argued that this is a de minimus or merely technical violation. Failure to 
comply strictly with the requirements under Rule 11 (b )(3) renders a judgment voidable under Rule 
60(b)(4). Blanc v. Laritz, 119 Idaho 359, 362, 806 P.2d 452,455 (Ct. App. 1991). 
It should also be noted that actual receipt has been eliminated by Rule 6(e). Rule 6(e) gives 
an automatic three (3) day extension anytime service is completed by mail. The purpose of Rule 6( e) 
make this clear: 
Although the Advisory Committee's Notes to the original or amended 
Rule 5(b) do not mention Rule 6( e), the latter rule clearly is intended 
to protect parties who are served with a pleading or other paper by 
mail from suffering a systematic diminution of their time to respond 
through the application of Rule 5(b), which provides that service is 
complete upon mailing, not receipt. The additional three days 
provided by Rule 6( e) to the party being served is thought to represent 
a reasonable transmission time, and a fair compromise between the 
harshness of measuring time strictly from the date of mailing and the 
indefiniteness of attempting to measure from the date of receipt, 
which in many cases would be unverifiable .... 
2 It should be noted that the twentieth (20th) day fell on Sunday, August 29, 2010. Per a literal reading of 
Rule 6(a), if the last day of the period falls on a Sunday it slides to the following Monday. I.R.C.P.6(a). If one adds 
the three (3) days after counting twenty (20) days as required by Rule 6(a), the last day of the proscribed period falls 
on Thursday. September 2,2010, and the first day any action could be taken would be Friday, September 3, 2010. 
Under this scenario, the Motion for Entry of Default was filed two days too soon. 
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WRIGHT AND MILLER, 4B FED. PRAC. AND PROC. § 1171 (3d ed.). Actual receipt is no longer 
relevant. It is the very uncertainty that exists in this case of trying to establish the date of actual 
receipt which Rule 6(e) resolves by giving everyone a consistent extra three (3) days to react. 
Rule 11 (b )(3) provides a readily identifiable, straightforward 
requirement for counsel and the courts to satisfy. Compliance with 
the rule obviates any need for judges to weigh conflicting evidence of 
actual notice or to speculate concerning a litigant's state of mind. An 
entitlement to relief [when there is strict compliance with the rule] 
produces consistent, predictable results, unaffected by the varying 
philosophies that underlie exercises of discretion by individual 
judges. 
Knight Ins. Inc. v. Knight, 109 Idaho 56, 60, 704 P.2d 960, 964 (Ct. App. 1985). Thus, the Keanes 
were entitled to a full twenty-three (23) days from the date of mailing. 
An Idaho case, nearly on all fours, is instructive. In Laritz, the defendant's attorney sought 
permission to withdraw. 119 Idaho at 360,806 P.2d at 453. On September 28, 1982, the magistrate 
allowed the attorney to withdraw directing that the defendant be notified under Rule 11(b)(3). !d. 
A copy of the order allowing the attorney to withdraw was mailed to the defendant's last known 
address on September 29, 1982. Id. at 362, 806 P.2d at 454. The magistrate issued an order entering 
default on October 21, 1982 ("Order of October 21"). !d. at 360,806 P.2d at 453. In a later action 
to recover attorney fees and costs, the defendant asserted that the Order of October 21 was 
procedurally invalid. Id. The magistrate judge ruled otherwise and judgment was entered. Id. at 
361, 806 P.2d at 454. Ultimately, the Order of October 21 was challenged in the district court as 
untimely and void under Rule 60(b)(4). !d. 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals noted that upon entry of an order granting leave to an attorney 
to withdraw from an action, no further proceedings can be had in that action which will affect the 
rights of the party of the withdrawing attorney for a period of twenty (20) days. 119 Idaho at 362, 
806 P.2d at 455. The Court of Appeals further recognized that under Rule 6(e)(1), three days are 
added to the twenty (20) day period specified in Rule 11 (b )(3) when the order allowing withdrawal 
is served upon the defendant by mail. Id. InLaritz, the Order of October 21 was entered twenty-two 
(22) days after mailing of the withdrawal order. Id. "Thus, since twenty-three days should have 
elapsed before Laritz'[sic] default was entered, the Order of October 21 is voidable under I.R.C.P. 
60(b)(4)." Id. In addition to an error in the wording of the order, the Court of Appeals ruled that 
proceedings taken within twenty-three (23) days of the withdrawal order was a failure to comply 
strictly with the requirements of Rule 11 (b )(3), thereby rendering the default judgment voidable 
under Rule 60(b)(4). Id. The entry of judgment was reversed. /d. 
This Idaho case supports the proposition that the Keanes should have had twenty-three (23) 
days of protection against any further proceedings. 3 Here, there were proceedings taken within that 
twenty-three (23) day period. The default judgment is void as a matter of law, and the matter should 
be remanded for trial on the merits. 
2. The Order Permitting Leave to Withdraw Failed to Comply with Rule 11(b)(3). 
The district court's Order Permitting Leave to Withdraw, to which Dorion filed his untimely 
Motion for Entry of Default, fails to state in its body the following: "or dismissal of the action of 
3 While in Laritz it was the order entering default that fell within the twenty-three (23) day proscribed 
period, it should make no difference to the analysis that the Motion for Entry of Default was filed within the twenty-
three (23) day proscribed period in the case at bar. 
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such party with prejudice." (See Motion to Augment, Maurer Aff., Ex. 1.) This is a separate and 
distinct ground for voiding the judgment. 
There must be strict compliance with Rule 11(b)(3) to obtain a valid judgment. Martinez v. 
Brown, 144 Idaho 410, 412, 162 P.3d 789, 791 (Ct. App. 2007). In Martinez, the district court's 
order of withdrawal failed to notify Martinez that his claim could be dismissed "with prejudice" 
should he fail to appoint a new attorney or appear on his own behalf within the designated period. 
Martinez, 144 Idaho at 412,162 P.3d at 791. For lack of these two words in the order of withdrawal, 
the Court of Appeals held that the default judgment entered against Martinez was invalid for failing 
to strictly satisfy the plain requirements of Rule 11(b)(3).4 Id. 
In Reinwald v. Eveland, 119 Idaho 111, 803 P.2d 10 17 (Ct. App. 1991), there was an appeal 
from an order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment. The Court of Appeals first noted 
that the standard of review was not discretion of the court but rather that if the judgment is voidable 
for failure to provide the notice required by Rule 11(b)(3) it will be set aside as a matter of law. 119 
Idaho at 112,803 P.2d at 1018. Quoting Rule 11(b)(3) the Court of Appeals specifically noted the 
language of the last sentence holding that it had particular significance. That sentence states: 
If such party fails to file and serve an additional written appearance 
in the action ... within such 20 day period, such failure shall be 
sufficient ground for entry of default and default judgment against 
such party or dismissal of the action of such party, with prejudice, 
without further notice, which shall be stated in the order of the court. 
4 In the case at bar, the order omitted even more language-"or dismissal of the action of such party with 
prejudice." 
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LR. c.P. 11 (b )(3) (emphasis added.) The Court of Appeals detennined that the order did not notify 
the defendant that, in addition to the possible consequences of the entry of a default, a judgment by 
default also could be taken against him without further notice. Reinwald, 119 Idaho at 112, 803 P.2d 
at 1018. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court erred as a matter of law in not granting the 
motion to set aside the default for failure to include these words because it is strict compliance, not 
substantial compliance, that is required by Rule 11(b)(3). Id. These same words (and more) were 
not present in this Order Pennitting Leave to Withdraw. 
Under Rule 11(b)(3), any failure to comply with the specific wording of the rule makes a 
judgment void. There need be no showing of prejudice and it does not matter whether the proper 
wording would have made a difference. What matters is the requirement of strict and absolute 
compliance. The words missing from the district court's Order Pennitting Leave to Withdraw are 
words that are required by the rule and their absence makes the judgment void. 
Therefore, the district court erred in refusing to grant the Keanes' Rule 60(b) Motion and the 
default judgment entered against the Keanes on January 14,2011, should be deemed void. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Set Aside the Default. 
The district court also abused its discretion when it failed to set aside the default entered on 
September 8, 2010. Entry of default is appropriate only when a party "has failed to plead or 
otherwise defend .... " I.R.C.P. 55(a)(l). In moving to set aside an entry of default, the more 
lenient "good cause" standard is applied. McFarland v. Curtis, 123 Idaho 931,936,854 P.2d 274, 
279 (et. App. 1993). In determining whether "good cause" exists, there are three primary 
considerations: (1) whether the default was willful; (2) whether setting aside the default would 
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prejudice the opposing party; and (3) whether a meritorious defense has been presented. Id. The 
district court acted outside the bounds of its discretion and failed to reach its decision by an exercise 
of reason in denying the Keanes' September 17,2010, Motion to Set Aside Default. 
In reaching its decision in the Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default 
and Plaintiff s Motion for Entry of DefaultJudgment ("December 29,2010 Order"), the district court 
failed to find that the Keanes' conduct was willful, that Dorion would be prejudiced by setting aside 
the default, or that the Keanes failed to present a meritorious defense. (R. Vol. I, p. 90.) The 
December 29,2010 Order is in stark contrast to the court's earlier May 21,2009, Opinion and Order 
on Defendants' Motion to Set Aside Default ("May 21, 2009 Order"), in which the court analyzed 
each consideration and granted the motion and set aside the earlier default. (R. Vol. I, pp. 41-42.) 
Instead, this time the court penalized the Keanes for what it deemed "neglect[ing] the lawsuit." (R. 
Vol. I, p. 90.) 
First, in regard to whether the Keanes had presented a meritorious defense, in the December 
29,2010 Order the district court looked to its May 21,2009 Order where it stated that the affidavit 
presented in support of the Keanes' Motion to Set Aside Default "was weak at best in presenting a 
meritorious defense." (R. Vol. I, p. 90.) The court then stated that the affidavit filed in support of 
the current Motion to Set Aside Default offered no additional facts demonstrating a meritorious 
defense. (Id.) However, the court failed to consider the Keanes' Answer (filed after the earlier 
default proceedings), which offered additional facts demonstrating a meritorious defense. (R. Vol. 
I, pp. 44-48.) 
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Second, the court failed to consider and address the Keanes' new argument that they had been 
offered an extension of time by opposing counsel in which to hire a new attorney. Instead, the court 
based its holding on the following reasoning: 
While Defendant Keane may not have understood the need to timely 
address the lawsuit in the beginning, it should have been blatantly 
apparent after the first default was entered. Instead, Defendant simply 
neglected the matter, not once but twice, with the consequence being 
entry of default. Defendant Keane's excuse was plausible once, but 
not twice. The lawsuit has been pending for nearly two years, during 
which time Plaintiff has made every effort to prosecute the matter 
while Defendant has failed to take the matter seriously and has chosen 
instead to neglect the lawsuit, addressing it only after defaults have 
been entered. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 90.) In essence, the district court was basing its decision on credibility issues. 
The court had no basis for its finding that the Keanes were "neglect[ing] the lawsuit" over 
the two years of its pendency, nor is such a finding a proper ground for entry of default under Rule 
55(a)(1). In the May 21, 2009 Order, the district court found that "Defendant Keane's excuse" that 
the Keanes thought an attorney had been retained but, in fact, had not, was the basis for good cause. 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 41-42.) Specifically, the court found that "the failure of the Defendants to timely 
respond was not a willful omission" and "no prejudice would result" to Dorion by setting aside the 
default. (/d.) The court set aside the default and the Keanes then fully defended Dorion's 
prosecution of the case until their counsel withdrew on August 5, 2010. Instead of addressing and 
considering the new arguments presented by the Keanes as to why they failed to file a timely written 
appearance, the court seems to find that "Defendant Keane's excuse" in the September 17,2010, 
Motion to Set Aside Default was the same "excuse" as that offered in the earlier Motion to Set Aside 
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Default. This is a clear misunderstanding of the Keanes' argument and of the bases for not timely 
appearmg. 
The court failed to address the Keanes' new argument that they were given an extension of 
time, failed to find that the Keanes were willful in their actions, failed to consider the meritorious 
defenses presented by the Keanes' Answer, and failed to address how Dorion would be prejudiced 
by setting aside the default. Therefore, the court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the 
default so that the case could proceed on its merits. 
D. The Keanes are Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal. 
Should the Keanes prevail on appeal, they are entitled to attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-
120(3). The basis of Dorion's claims against the Keanes is a commercial transaction. (R. Vol. I, pp. 
12-21.) "The court must always award attorney fees to the prevailing party 'in commercial 
transactions.'" Meyers v. Hansen, 148 Idaho 283, 292, 221 P.3d 81,90 (2009) (quoting I.C. § 12-
120(3». 
CONCLUSION 
The Keanes res pectfull y reques t that this Court reverse the district court's denial of their Rule 
60(b) Motion and remand so that the matter may be decided on the merits. In the alternative, the 
Keanes request that the Court find that the district court abused its discretion in failing to set aside 
the entry of default and reverse and remand for a trial on the merits. 
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